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Abstract. This paper assesses the effects of labour market policies on the unemployment outflow rate
while disentangling two channels, namely labour market tightness and employer–employee matching
efficiency. Using a sample of 11 OECD countries over the period 1985–2007, we treat the endogeneity of
market tightness with business cycle shocks and the tax wedge as instruments. We find that the replace-
ment rate of unemployment benefits, Active LabourMarket Policies as well as the tax wedge in countries
with poorly representative unions, have a significant, robust, and large impact on market tightness.
Employment protection has a negative but small impact on matching efficiency. Overall, policy effects
appear to be mostly channeled through market tightness and job creation.
1. Introduction
Nearly 4 years after the economic crisis, unemployment rates still remain significantly above
their pre-crisis level in a majority of OECD countries. With the rise in unemployment being
largely concentrated among specific categories of workers, one of the main concerns in
countries most severely hit is that persistently high unemployment levels eventually lead to the
emergence of a substantial pool of workers trapped in a situation of quasi-permanent unem-
ployment or with tenuous attachments to the labour market. Put differently, there is a risk that
the incidence of long-term unemployment remains high — or rises further — even as employ-
ment growth picks-up. Given that the incidence of long-term unemployment is directly related
to the unemployment outflow rate, this paper aims to evaluate the influence that policies and
institutions may have on the latter. This is done on the basis of macroeconomic data covering
11 OECD countries over the period 1985–2007.
More specifically, the paper seeks to identify the structural determinants of unemployment
outflow rates by using matching functions. The latter are used in labour economics to disen-
tangle the influence of the pace of job creation or labour market tightness (measured as the
ratio of job vacancies to unemployment) on unemployment outflows from that of the degree
of labour market frictions or matching efficiency (Blanchard and Diamond, 1989; Mortensen
and Pissarides, 1994; Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001; Pissarides, 2000). Factors contributing
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to stimulate labour demand and jobs creation will influence outflow rates through market
tightness, whereas those affecting job search intensity are expected to impact on the outflow
rate through matching efficiency.
The main contributions of this paper are of both a methodological and an empirical nature.
Whereas the properties of the matching function have been extensively studied (e.g. Coles and
Petrongolo, 2008; Gregg and Petrongolo, 2008), to the best of our knowledge it is the first time
that the outflow rate is decomposed into a system of structural equations that identifies the
channels through which the latter rate is affected by labour market policies and institutions.
In this regard, we find that the bulk of policy and institution impact is channelled by market
tightness, that is to say, through the pace of job creation.
In practice, our system of simultaneously determined equations allows for the treatment of
the endogeneity of market tightness with respect to the unemployment outflow rate. In a first
stage, we instrument labour market tightness by business cycles shocks as well as labour
market institutions that are deemed to have an impact on market tightness but none on
matching efficiency. These policy-based instruments include the tax wedge and its interaction
with the characteristics of wage bargaining systems. In a second stage, we regress the unem-
ployment outflow rate on predicted market tightness and on other institutional variables that
may influence the degree of labour market frictions and matching efficiency, namely the
characteristics of unemployment benefit systems and the degree of employment protection
or product market regulation. Overall, this approach delivers a credible estimation of the
relationship between unemployment outflows, labour market tightness, and labour market
policies.
In terms of empirical results, we find three robust and economically important effects on
market tightness stemming from the replacement rate of unemployment benefits, the volume
of Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) as well as the tax wedge (especially among
countries with intermediate or sector-based wage bargaining systems). The only policy vari-
able found to have a robust (and negative) effect on the outflow rate through matching
efficiency is employment protection on regular contracts. However, the latter effect is small in
terms of magnitude.
The next section presents the analytical framework that underpins the empirical model as
well as the related literature. The data are presented in Section 3, which is followed by the
empirical framework, the results, and a discussion. The last section concludes.
2. The relationship between unemployment outflow, market tightness, and labour market
policies and institutions
In this section, we explain the relationships between the unemployment outflow rate, labour
market tightness and labour market institutions with the help of a simple framework, which
is a simplified version of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) job-search theory. A more elaborate
model can be found in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999). Then, we explain our identification
strategy to assess the former relationships. Finally, we briefly review the literature dealing with
labour market institutions and the unemployment outflow rate.
2.1 Theoretical framework
The basic features are as follows: Potential jobs can be either filled or vacant and workers
can be either unemployed or employed (inactivity and job-to-job transitions are ignored). Job
creation takes place when a firm with a vacant job and a worker meet and start producing. The
rate at which vacant jobs and unemployed workers meet is determined by the homogeneous-
of-degree-one matching function f(u,v), where u and v represent the number of unemployed
workers and vacancies respectively, normalized by the size of the labour force (assumed to be
fixed). The higher the number of unemployed and the higher the number of vacancies, the
more matches, the more hires. The number of new hires per period is determined by a
Cobb–Douglas function of vacancies and the number of unemployed:
f u v u vt t t t( , ) ,=
−φ η η1 [1]
where the parameter η determines the elasticity of hires with respect to existing vacancies. The
parameter ϕ is deemed to capture all the factors that affect the efficiency of the matching
process. For instance, both a decrease in the job-search intensity of unemployed workers, or
an increased mismatch between the skills of the unemployed and the skills desired by firms,
lead to a decrease in ϕ.
Unemployed workers are identical and vacancies offer the highest wage, so that they are
always accepted. The unemployment outflow (or exit) rate f is simply equal to the number of
hires divided by the number of unemployed:
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where the ratio v/u is commonly referred to as market tightness. Conversely, the probability q
that an employer fills a vacancy is:
q
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A tax τ is levied on labour income in the form of personal income tax or social security
contributions. Consider the choice between unemployment and employment. If unemployed,
a worker receives b − h, where b is unemployment benefits and h is the private cost of being
unemployed. If employed, the same worker receives w − τ. Her surplus from working is
therefore w − b + h − τ. Conversely, if a firm employs this worker, it receives y − w where y is
the productivity of the match and w the wage paid to the worker. If it does not, the firm
receives nothing. Thus, the firm’s surplus is simply y − w. Adding these two surpluses, the total
surplus from the match is y − b + h − τ. Workers and firms bargain repeatedly over wages.
Defining β as the bargaining power of the worker, the latter obtains a share β of the total
surplus via Nash bargaining. Hence, the surplus V that firms extract when a vacancy is filled
and producing is:
V y b ht = − − + −( )( ).1 β τ [4]
Firm’s behaviour is as follows. There is a fixed cost c in posting a vacancy. The ex-ante
profit of a firm when posting a vacancy is equal to –c + q·V. Applying Mortensen and
Pissarides’s (1994) ‘free-entry’ condition that assumes the exhaustion of ex-ante profits,
one has:
− + =c qVt t 0. [5]
Replacing q and V in [5] by their expressions respectively given by [3] and [4], then using [2],
yields the following expression for market tightness:
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The above relationship suggests to describe the relationship between labour market policies
and institutions, market tightness and the unemployment outflow rate with the help of the
following system of simultaneously determined variables:
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2.2 Identification strategy
As made clear by the above system of equations, market tightness is endogenous to the
unemployment exit rate in the sense that important omitted variables (including matching
efficiency ϕ) simultaneously determine the latter two variables. The identification of the effect
of market tightness on unemployment outflow therefore requires an instrumental approach.
Along this line, we instrument market tightness in a first stage, whereas in a second-stage, the
unemployment outflow rate is regressed on predicted market tightness and a set of other
variables that excludes first-stage instruments.
Our main identifying assumption is that business cycle shocks affect market tightness but
have no direct effect on matching efficiency and unemployment outflow (i.e. that business
cycle shocks have no effect on unemployment outflow other than the one transmitted by
market tightness). To improve the quality of the first-stage regression, we consider one
policy-based instrument, namely the tax wedge, which is a composite indicator of labour and
personal income taxes (see Appendix S1). It is therefore assumed that the tax wedge has an
impact on market tightness and job creation, but none on matching efficiency (i.e. no direct
impact on unemployment outflows).
In practice, the above system of simultaneously determined equations separates out the
effects of labour market policies on job creation (through market tightness) from other effects
linked to labour market frictions (i.e. matching efficiency). Determining whether policies and
institutions influence the unemployment exit rate mainly through job creation or through
labour market frictions constitutes the main objective of this paper.
2.3 Related literature
Table 1 summarizes priors for the effects of each labour market institution on the outflow
rate as reflected by existing empirical and theoretical studies. These priors are consistent with
the identification strategy that was outlined above.
Unemployment insurance benefits are generally thought to have ambiguous effects on
market tightness, matching efficiency, and the exit rate. Equation [6] underlines a negative
effect of unemployment benefits b that may raise the reservation wage and lower the ratio v/u;
however, other theoretical studies (e.g. Acemoglu and Shimer, 2000) isolate positive effects of
unemployment insurance for the development of risky economic activities, which would imply
an increase in the v/u ratio. Similarly, there is mixed empirical evidence that longer and/or
more generous unemployment benefits may discourage job search (Card et al., 2007; Katz and
Meyer, 1990; Krueger and Mueller, 2010; Petrongolo, 2009), which in our framework would
translate into a decrease in ϕ.
ALMPs may increase market tightness (i.e. the ratio v/u) insofar as for instance placement
services reduce the cost c of posting a vacancy (see equation [6]). Similarly, training and
employment incentives may increase the private (opportunity) cost of unemployment h, hence
increase market tightness. ALMPs, and in particular Placement and Employment Services
(labelled as PES), may also have an impact on matching efficiency ϕ. In the empirical litera-
ture, there is mixed evidence regarding the effect of ALMPs on the probability of finding a job,
as it depends widely on the type of programme or training implemented and on the time
horizon over which the treatment effect is measured (see Boone and Van Ours, 2009; Card
et al., 2010).
High degree of employment protection and product market regulation are deemed to have
negative effects on the unemployment outflow rate (Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002), mainly
because they may lower the overall level of turnover on the labour market and reduce the
degree of matching efficiency. Stricter product market regulation and employment protection
are deemed to have an ambiguous impact on market tightness, as they may reduce the pace of
new vacancy posting but they may also raise the number of unfilled vacancies.1
The tax wedge τ, as well as any institution that reduces the profit share of firms 1 − β,
unambiguously decrease market tightness and the unemployment exit rate as shown by
equation [6] as well as by Mortensen and Pissarides (1999). In this regard, de Serres et al.
(2012) and Murtin et al. (2014) provide strong empirical evidence that the tax wedge reduces
outflows more strongly among countries where wage bargaining takes place at the sectoral
level rather than at the firm or at the economy-wide level. The intuition behind this empirical
finding is that highly centralized or highly decentralized wage bargaining systems are prone to
yield wage moderation and to mitigate the adverse effect of the tax wedge.
Excess demand, as captured by the output gap y, raises firms’ profits, vacancy creation and
unemployment outflows.
Table 1. Analytical priors on the relationship between institutions and the unemployment
outflow rate
Institution Parameter
Market
tightness
V/U
Matching
efficiency
E( f |V/U )
Unemployment
outflow rate
E( f )
Unemployment benefits b +/− +/−
φ +/−
ALMPs:
PES and administration φ, 1/c + + +
Employment incentives, training φ, h + + +
Employment protection φ +/− − −
Product market regulation φ − − −
Tax wedge τ − −
Excess coverage of wage bargaining
agreements
β − −
Output gap y + +
3. The data
3.1 Vacancy and unemployment outflow
The main data set on unemployment outflow is borrowed from Murtin et al. (2014). It
covers 11 countries (Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, the UK, the USA) and spans the period 1985–2007. The data frequency is annual. In
addition, vacancy data are extracted from various sources [OECD, Eurostat, Job Openings
and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS)] to construct annual series of the vacancy rate (i.e. the
number of vacancies divided by the number of employed workers plus vacancies) and of
market tightness (i.e. the number of vacancies divided by the number of unemployed workers).
As shown by the upper part of Table 2 as well as other studies (e.g. Elsby et al., 2008),
unemployment outflows are larger in most English-speaking and Nordic countries than in
other countries. In particular, the USA appears to be an outlier as it displays a very large,
albeit declining, outflow rate over time (Murtin and Robin, 2014; Robin, 2011). Countries
with high outflow rates tend also to display tighter labour markets, as the correlation between
outflow and market tightness equals 0.46 without the USA, and 0.82 with this country.
It is well known that the quality of vacancy data varies substantially across countries.
Vacancy data usually refer to job opportunities notified by an employer to a Job Centre or
Careers Office, which remained unfilled on the day of the count. Importantly, vacancies that
are not notified to employment agencies are excluded, so that the vacancy figures do not
represent the total number of vacancies in the economy. Moreover, national statistics differ in
a number of dimensions such as the period of reference or the type of eligible position. For
instance, vacancy data covers both the private and public sectors in France, whereas vacancies
on government-sponsored programmes are excluded in the UK.
To appraise the quality of the vacancy data, we regress the log unemployment outflow rate
on log market tightness country by country. If the vacancy rate is affected by measurement
errors, the coefficient of log market tightness is expected to be biased towards zero and the
R-squared of the regression to be low. The obtained results from these regressions are
Table 2. Descriptive statistics — average values 1985–2007
AUS BEL DEU ESP FRA GBR JPN NOR PRT SWE USA
Unemployment variables
Unemployment rate 7.52 8.64 8.02 16.52 10.16 7.44 3.93 4.09 6.18 5.78 5.68
Unemployment outflow
rate 15+
22.60 6.77 6.61 7.90 7.90 13.92 17.66 40.23 7.83 24.94 56.73
Market tightness 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.04 0.08 0.20 0.26 0.15 0.04 0.16 0.61
Labour market institutions
Initial replacement rate 23.34 49.09 38.45 65.43 56.49 24.98 32.87 51.55 48.16 77.94 28.20
Unemployment benefits
duration
1.01 0.86 0.72 0.47 0.60 0.80 0.31 0.60 0.48 0.35 0.46
EPL regular contracts 1.26 1.70 2.70 3.10 2.39 1.01 1.87 2.25 4.46 2.87 0.17
ALMPs 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.19 0.10 0.41 0.03
Tax wedge 28.14 41.25 35.45 30.05 41.42 28.95 22.77 49.66 26.79 52.21 23.60
Excess coverage 42.21 37.43 46.94 55.76 71.99 13.99 −5.06 14.16 39.65 3.50 3.77
PMR 3.25 4.39 4.08 4.12 4.95 3.03 3.98 4.20 4.88 3.75 2.54
Observations 20 20 20 20 16 19 15 20 17 17 5
EPL, employment protection legislation.
described in Appendix S1. Four countries turn out to have particularly low R2, namely
Belgium, France, Germany, and Portugal. In the robustness analysis section, the main regres-
sions are redone after excluding the latter four countries from the sample.
For illustrative purposes, Figure 1 presents the Beveridge curves, which depict the vacancy
rate with respect to unemployment, for four countries based on quarterly data. A negative
correlation is expected between the two variables as a large number of unemployed workers
would exhaust available vacancies. However, the relationship has generally been unstable, as
for instance in Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Figure 2 shows that a more stable
relationship emerges when unemployment is related to market tightness instead of the vacancy
rate. Indeed, market tightness relates the pool of vacant jobs to that of job-seekers, and such
ratio would seem to be a better measure of job search conditions on the labour market than
the vacancy rate. Indeed, the latter relates the pool of vacant jobs to that of employed workers,
who do not necessarily look for another job, or do so with a lower intensity.
3.2 Labour market institutions
The data on labour market institutions include: (i) the replacement rate of unemployment
benefits in the initial year of reception; (ii) the duration of unemployment benefits, as mea-
sured by the ratio of the average replacement rate during the first 5 years of reception to the
initial replacement rate;2 (iii) real spending on ALMPs per unemployed worker normalized by
a proxy of average income (GDP per worker);3 (iv) a measure of the tax wedge constructed by
the OECD.4 The tax wedge is in some cases interacted with a proxy for the degree of
centralization/coordination embedded in the wage bargaining system, namely the difference
(labelled as ‘excess coverage of union agreements’) between the share of workers covered by
collective agreements (coverage rate) and union density;5 (v) the OECD index of product
Figure 1. Beveridge curves in four OECD countries
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market regulation (the PMR index); and (vi) the OECD index of employment protection
legislation for regular contracts (labelled as EPR). The set of labour market institutions is
complemented by a proxy for business cycle conditions, namely the OECD estimate of the
output gap. In total, one obtains 189 usable observations for the econometric framework.
The identification of policy and institutional effects relies on the number of reforms over
time. Indeed, country fixed effects will be systematically included in the panel data model.
From that point of view, all indicators display a satisfactory degree of time variation as
reflected by the simple decomposition of the variance between and within countries depicted
in Table 3. Not surprisingly, the variance between countries is the largest component in a
majority of cases with the noticeable exception of the PMR index. However, standard devia-
tions within countries always represent significant policy changes. For instance, an increase in
the replacement rate by 2.8 percentage points or an increase in the tax wedge by 2.4 percentage
points are deemed to have observable consequences on labour market outcomes.
4. The policy and institutional determinants of the unemployment outflow rate
This section describes the empirical framework, which explains cross-country differences in
outflow rates with the help of a matching function. The relationships between labour market
institutions and two structural determinants of outflows, namely market tightness and match-
ing efficiency, are examined. Then, a robustness analysis is proposed. Finally, the magnitude
of the policy and institutional effects is assessed.
Figure 2. Market tightness and the rate of unemployment in four OECD countries
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Notes: Market tightness is defined as the ratio of the number of vacancies to the number of unemployed workers. Quarterly
data taken from various sources (OECD, Eurostat, JOLTS). The period covered is 1974Q1–2010Q2 for Germany,
1988Q1–2009Q4 for the Netherlands, 1961Q3–2010Q2 for Sweden, 2000Q4–2010Q2 for the USA.
4.1 Empirical framework
To empirically relate cross-country differences in outflow rates to differences in the insti-
tutional environment, it is convenient to log-linearize the matching function described by
equation [2]. We assume a common vacancy elasticity (parameter η) across countries6 and
we allow for cross-country differences in matching efficiency ϕi,t and in market tightness
ϕi,t = vi,t/ui,t. The econometric model is the following:
log log log ,, , , ,f wi t i t i t i t= + +φ η θ [8]
where w is a residual term. We denote as X and Y the two sets of labour market institutions
that have an influence upon respectively market tightness and matching efficiency. As made
clear by the ‘free-entry’ condition and system [7], any institutional variable affecting matching
efficiency is also a determinant of market tightness, so that the set Y is included into X (and
even strictly included as the tax wedge will be used as an instrument of market tightness).
Moreover, business cycle shocks proxied by the output gap Z is taken as another instrument
of market tightness. One has therefore the following system of equations:
log
log
, , , ,
, ,
lo
θ β γ
β
i t i
v
t
v
i t
v
i t
v
i t
i t i
f
t
f
i t
f
a d X Z u
f a d Y
= + + + +
= + +
g
, ,
,
log ,
φ
η θ
i t
i t i tw   + +
⎧
⎨⎪
⎩⎪
[9]
where ai denote country fixed effects and dt time fixed effects. The first equation can be labelled
as the market tightness equation, the second one as the outflow equation.
In practice, labour market policy and institutions Y that are deemed to influence matching
efficiency are the characteristics of unemployment benefits (replacement rate and duration),
the level of employment protection of regular contracts, as well as the degree of product
market regulation. As mentioned, these variables must be included both in the market tight-
ness equation and in the outflow equation. Conversely, the set of institutionsX includesY plus
the tax wedge and its interaction with the excess coverage variable.
The above system is estimated with a two-stage ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator
(2-SLS). In the first-stage, the first equation of the system (market tightness) is estimated. In
a second-stage, the second equation (outflow) is estimated while using the predicted market
tightness variable derived from stage one.
4.2 Main results
Table 4 presents the instrumental variables (IV) estimation results with the first-stage
market tightness equations on columns 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, and 15 and the second-stage
Table 3. Analysis of variance for labour market institutions — 1985–2007
Standard deviation
between countries
Standard deviation
within countries
Initial replacement rate 20.30 2.80
Unemployment benefits duration
EPL regular contracts 1.10 0.20
ALMPs 0.10 0.06
Tax wedge 10.00 2.40
Excess coverage 27.00 5.90
PMR 0.60 1.10
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.
outflow equations on columns 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, and 16. Selected instruments are in all cases
the output gap and the tax wedge, as well as the interaction between the tax wedge and excess
coverage in column 15. The tax wedge is lagged 3 years to increase its chance of being strictly
exogenous to unemployment outflow. In all IV regressions, there is no evidence of weak
instruments as F-statistics are comfortably large. Furthermore, our two (or three) instruments
always pass the Sargan test of instruments validity, as the p-values never reject the null
assumption of instruments joint exogeneity.
Starting with the determinants of market tightness (first-stage equations), the output gap
always displays highly significant coefficients with an expected positive sign (excess demand
fosters vacancy creation), whereas the tax wedge (as well as its interaction with excess coverage
in column 15) displays in most cases a highly significant and negative coefficient. In addition,
the initial replacement rate turns out to be (in two cases out of three highly) significant and
negative, whereas ALMPs are always significantly and positively associated with market
tightness. Other institutional variables, including the average replacement rates, the duration
of unemployment benefits, the degree of employment protection and product market regula-
tion, do not display robust coefficients.
Moving to the institutional determinants of matching efficiency (second-stage equations
displayed on columns 4-6-8-10-12 and 14), we find that the duration of unemployment benefits
is unambiguously and negatively related to matching efficiency and unemployment outflows.
Moreover, the degree of employment protection displays a highly significant and negative
coefficient in columns 12 and 14 whereas other institutions are controlled for, but fails to be
significant on column 8.
Summing up, the tax wedge, ALMPs, and the initial replacement can be viewed as signifi-
cant determinants of market tightness, whereas the duration of unemployment benefits and
employment protection are linked to matching efficiency. The robustness of these results are
examined in the next subsection.
4.3 Robustness analysis
The sensitivity of previous results relative to the quality of vacancy data is assessed in two
ways. First, we trim the sample from outlier observations, deleting about 10 per cent of the
sample for which unemployment outflow or market tightness take outlier values (either at
the top or at the bottom or their respective distribution). Second, we restrict the sample to the
countries that display higher quality data. In practice, we exclude the four countries (Belgium,
France, Germany, and Portugal) in which vacancy data explain little of the unemployment
exit rate. These are the countries for which a country-specific regression of log unemployment
outflow on log market tightness displays a low R2 (see Appendix S1). In a third set of
regressions, we trim the data and we exclude the above four countries. In this case, the sample
has a much smaller size (only 103 observations versus 189 formerly), so it is a priori uncertain
whether the estimation would deliver better results because of higher-quality data or poorer
estimates due to a smaller sample size.
The results depicted in Table 5 largely confirm the results obtained from Table 4, while
offering some nuances. Across all regressions, ALMPs and the initial replacement rate are
always significant determinants of market tightness, but the tax wedge is only significant in
interaction with excess coverage. As already noticed by Calmfors and Driffill (1988), Daveri
and Tabellini (2000) as well as de Serres et al. (2012), disentangling between countries with
respect to their degree of coordination in wage bargaining is important when it comes to the
analysis of the relationship between unemployment, labour taxes, and wages.
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Moreover, employment protection is always significant across outflow regressions, which
highlights a robust adverse effect of employment protection on matching efficiency. In con-
trast, the duration of unemployment benefits loses its significance when the four countries are
excluded from the sample. So the only one robust determinant of matching efficiency is
employment protection.7
4.4 Accounting for hysteresis
The robustness of previous results is further evaluated in the light of a more general,
state-dependent, matching function where time persistence in the outflow rate is introduced.
Several theoretical and empirical studies point to a negative effect of the duration of unem-
ployment spells on the probability to exit unemployment (Bover et al., 2002; Dantan and
Murtin, 2014; Elsby et al., 2008; Machin and Manning, 1999; Pissarides, 1992; Shimer, 2008;
Van Den Berg and Van Ours, 1996). Intuitively, long spells of unemployment may imply a
depreciation of human capital, or lead to lower job-search intensity and to discouragement
effects.
The functional form of the matching function can easily be amended to allow for the
possible influence of the time spent in unemployment on the probability of exiting unemploy-
ment. Let us write the outflow rate as:
f
v
u
Dt
t
t
t
t
=
⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ ( )−φ
η
ρ , [10]
where Dt is the time spent in unemployment at the beginning of period t, and ρt a positive
coefficient that may eventually vary across countries and time. As f is expressed on a monthly
basis,D represents the number of months spent in unemployment and it is strictly greater than
one. Hence the larger ρ the smaller the outflow rate f. Assuming for simplicity that the time
spent in unemployment can be proxied by the inverse of the lagged outflow rate (i.e. that
D
f
t
t
=
−
1
1
),8 the following system of equations is obtained from the log-linearization of [9]:
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The above system is identical to the former one except that the lagged unemployment outflow
rate is introduced in the outflow equation. To estimate this new model, a two-stage procedure
is adopted. In the first-stage, the market tightness equation is estimated via OLS and its
predicted value is constructed. In the second-stage, the outflow equation is estimated by using
the former predictor and an OLS estimator or Arellano and Bond’s (1991) first-difference
generalized method of moments (DIF-GMM) estimator, while retaining a common and
constant autocorrelation coefficient (i.e. ρi,t = ρ).9,10 To conduct this empirical analysis, we use
the sample that was trimmed from outlier observations.
As shown by Table 6, the static results reported on Table 5 are relatively robust to the
existence of persistence effects.11 Regarding the determinants of matching efficiency presented
on columns 2 and 3, we find that employment protection entails a robust adverse effect on
unemployment outflows. As before, the negative effect of unemployment benefits duration is
more fragile, as it is significant only in column 2.
To explore further the link between policies and persistence, the coefficient ρ can be
conditioned on a set of institutional variablesW. A logit functional form is used to ensure that
ρ is always strictly smaller than 1. The following non-linear system can be estimated by
combining the two-stage estimation approach with non-linear least squares (NLS) for the
outflow equation:
Table 6. The institutional determinants of market tightness, matching efficiency, and
hysteresis effects
Equation:
First-stage
(market tightness)
Second-stage
(matching efficiency)
Dependent variable: log V/U log f
Estimator:
OLS IV DIF-GMM NLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conditional persistence
(coefficient of log f−1)
Constant 0.695*** 0.277*** −1.335
(0.042) (0.090) (1.212)
Initial replacement rate 0.013
(0.012)
Duration of unemployment benefits 2.007*
(1.027)
Other variables
(matching efficiency)
Instrumented log market tightness 0.259*** 0.314*** 0.275***
(0.051) (0.057) (0.053)
Initial replacement rate −0.066*** 0.011* 0.005 0.017**
(0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Duration of unemployment benefits 0.696 −0.623** −0.254 0.336
(0.572) (0.252) (0.321) (0.555)
EPL regular contracts 0.290*** −0.111*** −0.224* −0.137**
(0.100) (0.042) (0.135) (0.058)
PMR 0.017 0.024 0.085 0.023
(0.070) (0.033) (0.072) (0.034)
ALMPs 6.102*** −0.631 −0.362 −0.458
(1.099) (0.404) (0.698) (0.546)
Tax wedge −0.023
(0.015)
Tax wedge × excess coverage −0.002***
(0.000)
Output gap 0.130***
(0.016)
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.95 0.98 — 0.98
N 170 170 159 170
*/**/*** for the 10/5/1 per cent confidence levels respectively.
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As mentioned above, the higher the degree of persistence (ρ), the lower the outflow rate (as
log ft−1 < 0). Hence, variables positively linked to the coefficient of persistence can be viewed as
raising the duration of unemployment spells and reducing the outflow rate.
Table 6 column 4 reports the results of this non-linear estimation. Several potential deter-
minants of hysteresis are tested, in particular our proxy for the duration of unemployment
benefits. We find that longer benefit duration increases the length of unemployment spells and
the time persistence of unemployment outflows. In this regression, the significance of the
adverse effect of employment protection on matching efficiency is preserved, whereas the
replacement rate of unemployment benefits displays a positive sign. This may be interpreted
as a positive effect of unemployment insurance on the quality of employer–employees match,
or be disregarded as a statistical anomaly.12
Furthermore, the business cycle may affect directly the exit from unemployment over and
above its effects on labour market tightness, as in a bad recession the unemployed may get
discouraged and become non-employed and, in parallel, in good times non-employed people
may be encouraged to come back to the labour market. Similarly, if a high tax wedge creates
unemployment traps, then matching efficiency may decrease together with labour market
tightness. Both views challenge the assumption that our main instruments, namely the output
gap and the tax wedge, are valid and affect the outflow rate only through their effect on market
tightness. To provide a quick check, we have tested for the significance of our instruments
when they are included in the second-stage regression. Both failed to be significant, which
supports our main exclusion restriction.
4.5 Magnitude of policy effects
To gauge the magnitude of the estimated policy effects, we calculate the variation in
outflows associated with the increase in each policy indicator by one within-country standard
deviation. We select three different specifications extracted from the various tables. We
differentiate the policy effects according to the channel of transmission, namely market
tightness or matching efficiency. The calculated effect on market tightness are multiplied by
the estimated market tightness’s elasticity in the outflow equation.
Table 7 displays the results for each policy or institution while also indicating the respective
channels of transmission. We used the point estimates of each coefficient, while highlighting
with significance thresholds of these estimates (denoted as */**/*** for the 10/5/1 per cent
confidence levels respectively). This table offers a quick overview of the policy and institu-
tional reforms that matter from the perspective of a policy-maker.13
Overall, we find that market tightness carries the bulk of policy and institutional effects. The
replacement rate, ALMPs, and the tax wedge among countries with high excess coverage
(intermediate wage bargaining systems) have a large effect on market tightness and unem-
ployment outflows. Regarding matching efficiency, the effect of employment protection has a
small magnitude. The adverse effect of unemployment benefits duration on matching effi-
ciency is a bit larger, but as mentioned above, it does not always rely on robust estimates.
Hence, market tightness and more generally job creation can be viewed as the main channel
through which policies and institutions have an impact upon the unemployment outflow rate.
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5. Conclusion
This paper explores the policy and institutional determinants of the unemployment outflow
rate using a sample of 11 OECD countries observed between 1985 and 2007. We use matching
functions to identify the effects of policies or institutions on the outflow rate via two channels,
namely the number of job vacancies relative to the pool of unemployed (market tightness),
and the degree of employer–employee matching efficiency. We treat the endogeneity of market
tightness to unemployment outflow with the help of a system of simultaneously determined
equations, using business cycle shocks and the tax wedge as instruments of market tightness.
We find that the replacement rate of unemployment benefits, ALMPs as well as the tax wedge
in countries with intermediate or sector-based wage bargaining systems, have a large impact
on market tightness. Employment protection and the duration of unemployment benefits may
reduce matching efficiency, but these effects are deemed to have a smaller magnitude. Overall,
the bulk of policy and institution action on unemployment outflows appear to be channeled
by market tightness and job creation.
Notes
1 The impact of employment protection on unemployment is more ambiguous. For instance, strict
employment protection may lower the creation of vacancies but also the rate of job destruction, with
little effect on unemployment.
2 If the replacement rate is assumed to decrease exponentially over time, its half-life is equal to 69
per cent of the ratio used in this study.
3 In order to remove cyclical variations in ALMPs that result from cyclical unemployment variations,
we apply a Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filter to the series and use only this trend component in subsequent
regressions. Thus this procedure corrects for the endogeneity that arises from the fact that ALMP
spending has traditionally been relatively insensitive to cyclical changes in the unemployment rate.
However, it does not address the endogeneity problem that may arise when the variation in ALMP
spending falls short of the variation in the structural rate of unemployment.
4 The OECD tax wedge is a summary index of labour and personal income taxes. It was preferred to
a simple labour tax index as the latter series is affected by a break in the late 1990s. However, our main
results are largely unaffected if we replace the tax wedge by labour taxes.
5 In the presence of ‘excess coverage’ of collective agreements, union members receive a higher ‘outside
option’ (fall-back income) as they have the possibility to reallocate in the non-unionized sector covered
by collective agreement. This raises their bargained wage as well as unemployment, all the more so as
payroll taxes are large (seeMurtin et al., 2014). In spirit, this is the idea as in Calmfors andDriffill (1988),
who argue that largely centralized (economy-wide) and largely decentralized (firm-level) wage bargain-
ing systems lead to a lower unemployment rate relative to intermediate systems where bargaining takes
place at the sectoral level. Indeed, the variable ‘excess coverage’ tends to be higher among intermediate
systems, and lower among both centralized and decentralized ones. Hence, it can be seen as a convenient
proxy for the so-called ‘Calmfors–Driffill’ hypothesis. With respect to ad-hoc indices of the degree of
coordination of wage bargaining systems, it is a continuous variable that does not rely on subjective
judgement.
6 In unreported calculations we show that cross-country differences in parameter η explain little of
the cross-country differences in unemployment outflows compared with cross-country differences in
matching efficiency and market tightness. These calculations are available from the authors upon
request.
7 All regressions pass the overidentifying restrictions test and there is no evidence of weak instruments
in first-stage regressions.
8 Actually, unemployment duration should depend on all lags of the outflow rate. Introducing only the
first lag aims to preserve a parsimonious model.
9 GMM have advantages and drawbacks. They allow a stronger claim that our estimates represent
causal effects under the assumption of weak exogeneity of the explanatory variables. However,
DIF-GMM may suffer from weak instruments problems. To remedy for that problem, Blundell and
Bond’s (1998) system GMM (SYS-GMM) propose additional instruments that would hardly be valid in
our context, as their use relies on the assumption that country fixed effects are independent of the
unemployment’s growth rate. As emphasized by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), this is highly unlikely
so we refrain from using SYS-GMM in this study.
10 The DIF-GMM regression reported here passes the Arellano-Bond specification test for the
autocorrelation of residuals as well as the Hansen test of joint exogeneity of instruments. However,
the latter test is weak due to the small number of groups (countries). For the IV and NLS regressions,
the autocorrelation of residuals was estimated and found to be not significantly different from zero.
11 The market tightness equation described on Table 6 column 1 is identical to that presented in
Table 5 column 3.
12 Actually, equation [7] shows that any variable affecting matching efficiency ϕ, such as the replace-
ment rate, should be included in both the first-stage and second-stage equations. It is therefore a bit
surprising that such a variable switches sign across the two regressions. However, equation [7] also shows
that this may happen if the latter variable affects structural coefficients b, h, or c in opposite direction.
For instance, a higher replacement may indeed increase matching efficiency ϕ as suggested by column 4,
but it may also reduce the match’s surplus y − b and lower market tightness overall as reported on
column 1.
13 It is recalled that we used for each simulation the within-country standard deviation of each
institution, rather than its cross-country and cross-time sample standard deviation.
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